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ABSTRACT
We provide evidence on the real effects of credit supply shocks. By utilizing a new firm-level database
from six Latin American countries between 1990 to 2005 and using a differences-indifferences methodology,
we empirically test whether bank credit supply shocks affect exporters’ investment holding their creditworthiness
constant. We compare investment undertaken by domestic exporters to that of foreign-owned exporters,
where the latter’s exposure to the liquidity shock in the domestic banking sector is lower. Conditional
on changes in firms’ exposure to short term foreign currency debt, we find that foreign-owned exporters
increase investment by 15 percentage points relative to domestic exporters in the aftermath of steep
devaluations. This result only holds when the currency crisis occurs simultaneously with a banking
crisis, implying that the key factor hindering investment and growth in the aftermath of financial crises



















How do ﬁnancial crises turn into real recessions? There are two leading views. The ﬁrst view
highlights the importance of a troubled banking sector that cuts lending in the face of a negative
liquidity shock (bank lending channel). As argued by Bernanke (1983) if ﬁrms cannot smooth out
the liquidity shortage from their banks, this can have large contractionary real eﬀects. Chang and
Velasco (2001) develop a model for a typical emerging market crisis, where deteriorating access to
liquidity is at the center of the problem, hindering investment and growth. During the 2007–2009
global crisis central banks around the world spent hundreds of billions of dollars to rescue their
banking systems in fear of such shortages in lending.
The second view stresses the relevance of ﬁrms’ weak balance sheets and the associated decline
in their net worth (balance sheet channel).1 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show that shocks that
aﬀect net worth can amplify ﬂuctuations. Business downturns deteriorate ﬁrms’ net worth, which
increase the cost of borrowing and decrease investment even further (the so-called accelerator
eﬀect). The deterioration of ﬁrms’ net worth can be the result of a “maturity mismatch” and/or a
“currency mismatch” in ﬁrms’ balance sheets. Maturity mismatch refers to the practice of ﬁnancing
relatively illiquid long-term assets with short-term debt (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1996)). Currency mismatch results from the practice of denominating assets and liabilities in
diﬀerent currencies and hence exposing the ﬁrm to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Cespedes, Chang
and Velasco (2004) propose a model in which insolvent ﬁrms with weak balance sheets cannot
borrow and contract production during depreciations.2 Given the possibility of such balance sheet
eﬀects, central banks have been reluctant to let currencies devalue in response to external shocks,
as shown by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
In order to be able to link ﬁnancial crises to real outcomes, we have to know the relative
importance of these ﬁnancial constraints. Is it the case that ﬁrms cannot borrow due to insolvency
or is it the case that banks cannot extend credit given the credit crunch? Both of these channels
may cause ﬁrms to decrease investment and hinder growth. Our contribution in this paper is
twofold. First and foremost, we provide systematic evidence on how ﬁnancial crises turn into
recessions by disentangling these two main sources of ﬁnancing constraints, bank illiquidity versus
ﬁrm insolvency. Second, we provide ﬁrst-time evidence on substantial real eﬀects of bank credit
1Note that the literature also refers to this as the collateral channel since a negative (positive) shock to ﬁrms’
collateral (which is part of the balance sheet) causes ﬁrms’ borrowing capacity and net worth to go down (up). See
Holmstorm and Tirole (1997).
2See also Krugman (1999) and Eichengreen and Hausman (1999).
2supply shocks, namely on ﬁrm-level investment. Although, there is an extensive empirical literature
on the bank lending channel that tests the link between shocks to bank capital and the decline in
credit provision for ﬁrms, this literature has so far been unsuccessful in providing evidence on the
eﬀects of such shocks on real outcomes.3
The main challenge to identiﬁcation comes from the necessity of separating the demand for credit
by ﬁrms from the supply of credit by banks while conditioning on changes in ﬁrms’ creditworthiness
as a result of shocks to their balance sheet. To do so, we utilize the experience of six Latin American
countries that went through a range of crises during 1990–2005. We rest our identiﬁcation on the
fact that diﬀerent types of crises—currency versus banking—aﬀect the supply and demand of credit
diﬀerentially. During a currency crisis and a twin crisis (which involves both currency and banking
crises) demand for credit by exporters will be relatively higher given the depreciated currency, while
supply of credit will be relatively lower under a twin crisis. Hence, we assume the demand for credit
on the part of exporters goes up under both type of crises while the supply of credit goes down
relatively more under twin crises. The key is to compare the investment undertaken by exporters
under currency crises episodes, where there is a positive demand shock, with the investment of
exporters under a twin crisis. In the latter case, the proﬁt opportunity is still there but there is
also an economy wide credit shortage as a result of the negative supply shock to domestic banks.
In these twin crisis episodes, prior to the currency crash the banking system collapses, as shown by
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010).
We identify from within ﬁrm changes and therefore we must control for changes in ﬁrms’ credit-
worthiness to disentangle the ﬁnancing constraints. Since both types of crises involve a depreciation
of the domestic currency in excess of 25 percent, the creditworthiness of exporters with foreign cur-
rency denominated debt is at stake under both type of crises. Conditioning on the changes in cred-
itworthiness through holdings of foreign currency debt, we exploit the degree of foreign ownership
of the ﬁrm, as a proxy for ﬁrm-level liquidity. This strategy allows us to investigate the diﬀeren-
tial response of foreign-owned versus domestic exporters to a positive demand shock—conditioning
on their holdings of foreign currency debt—under currency and twin crises, where only the latter
involves a big negative supply shock to the local banking sector.4
3Most of this literature has not focused on real activity. An early exception is the work by Peek and Rosengren
(2000), who investigated using state level data from the U.S., changes in real estate activity in states with large
presence of Japanese banks after the Japan banking crisis. Two recent exceptions are the work by Paravisini,
Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2011), and the work by Amiti and Weinstein (2011). Both papers focus solely
on exports, showing a negative eﬀect of bank supply shocks on exports. See section 2 for a detailed review.
4In a recent paper Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro-Alcalde and Saurina (2011) propose an alternative strategy to identify
3We study four episodes of currency crises (Mexico 1995, Argentina 2002, Brazil 1999 and 2002).
Two of these episodes were twin crises since they were combined with a banking crisis (Mexico 1994,
Argentina 2001). In order to have ﬁrm-level measures of insolvency and liquidity over time, we have
hand-collected a unique panel database with annual accounting information for the whole universe
of listed non-ﬁnancial companies in six Latin American countries, spanning the period 1990 to 2005.
For these 1,300 listed ﬁrms, we observe time-varying measures of the currency denomination and
maturity structure of both debt and assets, ﬁrm’s export revenue, and foreign ownership stakes.
To our knowledge, the data is unique in an emerging market setting as it contains cross-country,
time-varying information on the currency and maturity composition of ﬁrms’ balance sheets, the
breakdown of sales into domestic and export revenues, and a precise measure of foreign ownership.
We deﬁne a potentially insolvent ﬁrm as one with high leverage and holdings of short-term for-
eign currency denominated debt that are not matched by a dollar denominated stream of income
like dollar assets and/or export revenue. This is based on Allen et al. (2002), who argue that ma-
turity and currency mismatch interact to determine ﬁrm’s solvency risk. These ﬁrms are obviously
more likely to experience a decline in net worth in the face of a currency crisis. We measure the
liquidity shock, ﬁrst, at the country-level, by focusing on twin crisis episodes that are characterized
by a general dry up of credit in the year prior to the currency crisis for all ﬁrms. Second, we
use diﬀerent ﬁrm-level measures that proxy the relative ease of access to ﬁnance, such as bond
and stock issuance abroad, and also direct foreign investment into the ﬁrm. Given that during
crises times markets shy away from emerging countries the former may not be the best measures
of access to ﬁnance during such times, as argued by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). Instead, we
argue that foreign ownership that captures direct and portfolio equity investment by foreigners is
a better measure of access to ﬁnance during ﬁnancial crises and use it throughout the analysis as
our preferred ﬁrm-level measure of access to liquidity. The reason is that foreign-owned ﬁrms are
likely to have better access to international markets during crises in the absence of well function-
ing domestic banks. Foreign aﬃliates also have the possibility of drawing funds from the parent
the eﬀect of negative supply shocks to banks on domestic credit provision based on matched bank-ﬁrm level data.
They provide evidence that the bank lending channel is stronger if one accounts for unobserved time-varying ﬁrm
heterogeneity. Their estimation strategy that uses ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects prevents studying the eﬀects of shocks to
banks on ﬁrm-level real outcomes.
4company through internal capital-market lending.5
The diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy allows us to investigate the following hy-
pothesis. If the illiquidity channel is the main source of ﬁnancial constraints, foreign-owned ex-
porters should perform better compared to domestic exporters during twin crises but not during
currency crises, conditional on short-term foreign currency denominated debt and leverage. The
reason is that only the former is associated with an illiquidity problem that does not aﬀect foreign
ﬁrms (or would aﬀect them relatively less than domestic ﬁrms). Notice in this case we are holding
the balance sheet channel constant, by comparing exporters holding short-term dollar debt that
only diﬀer in ownership status. In other words, given two ﬁrms with the same level of short-term
dollar debt and exports, only the foreign-owned ﬁrm would increase investment during twin crises.
We account for unobserved ﬁrm-level heterogeneity via ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence we solely identify
from within ﬁrm changes. Use of sector-year ﬁxed eﬀects accounts for all macro and industry supply
and demand shocks that are common to all exporters in an industry. The panel dimension of our
data allows us to condition on many country speciﬁc policy changes and other shocks through the
use of country-year eﬀects. For example, if the shock is common to all our countries (or to the
world) then it will be absorbed by our time eﬀects. The country-year eﬀects will also allow us to
account for the diﬀerent nature of each crisis, valuation eﬀects and the prior country-level trends.
Although the direction of causality between banking and currency crises is debated in the
literature (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example) for our purposes this is not relevant
given our diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences methodology that identiﬁes from relative changes in ﬁrm-level
outcomes. In the twin crisis episodes that we consider the banking crises were not the result of
ﬁrm bankruptcies as in some other countries and they predated the currency crises. Nevertheless in
order to avoid any concerns about anticipating the currency crisis we conduct most of our analysis
based on predetermined variables that characterized ﬁrms according to their economic outcomes
three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis in each country.
A key advantage of our estimation strategy is that it allows to quantify the extra investment
undertaken by ﬁrms with access to liquidity as well as the decline in investment as a result of a
balance sheet weakness. Our main results are summarized as follows. Conditional on exposure to
short term dollar debt, foreign-owned exporters perform better than domestic exporters only during
5Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) argue that multinational aﬃliates access parent equity when local ﬁrms are most
constrained. Similarly, Antras, Desai and Foley (2009) present evidence that suggests that even during “normal”
times, foreign aﬃliates increase their reliance on capital ﬂows from the parent company in the presence of weak
ﬁnancial institutions in the country of operation.
5twin crises, where domestic ﬁrms access to ﬁnance is limited given the troubled banking sector.
There is no diﬀerence in investment between these ﬁrms during currency crises. This implies that
both set of exporters have similar access to liquidity under currency crises. During twin crises,
however, domestic exporters suﬀer from the credit crunch. Conditional on changes in short term
dollar denominated debt, foreign-owned exporters increase investment by 15 percentage points
relative to domestic exporters. Domestic exporters in turn, decrease investment by 11 percentage
points relative to foreign exporters. The latter eﬀect suggests not only the inability of domestic
exporters to take the investment opportunity but the additional hampering eﬀect of not being able
to roll over the short-term debt. Overall our results point to the key role of illiquidity rather than
insolvency as the main source of ﬁnancial constraint that hinders investment and growth in the
aftermath of ﬁnancial crises. This result is fully consistent with the model of Chang and Velasco
(2001), where adding foreign direct investment precludes the bank run result of their model.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents our data.
Section 4 discusses the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6
presents robustness analysis and discusses alternative stories and threats to identiﬁcation. Section
7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to diﬀerent strands of the literature. First, the literature on the bank lending
channel focuses on establishing the causal link between a shock to bank capital and lower lending
to ﬁrms. Unfortunately due to data and/or estimation strategy limitations, this literature does
not study the real eﬀects of lower credit such as the eﬀects on ﬁrms’ investment. The aim of this
literature is to establish a casual relationship from the negative supply shocks to banks to declining
credit provision to ﬁrms. The ﬁndings in a developing country context show that this is indeed the
case.6
Second, our paper draws from the literature on the organization of the ﬁrm and in particular,
the recent theoretical advances that highlight the interplay by ﬁrm heterogeneity and incomplete
contracts in explaining the degree of vertical integration of the ﬁrm.7 Speciﬁcally, Antras, Desai
and Foley (2009) develop a model in which ﬁrms wanting to exploit technologies abroad will engage
in foreign direct investment, acting as multinationals especially in environments with weak investor
6See Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), and Schnabl (2010).
7See Antras (2003, 2005); Antras and Helpman (2004).
6protection. External funders require multinational companies’ participation in the local project
to ensure better monitoring of the investment. As a result, weak ﬁnancial institutions increase
the reliance on capital ﬂows from the parent company. This higher reliance on ﬁnancing through
internal capital markets by the foreign aﬃliate in general plays a critical role during ﬁnancial
crises. There is a growing literature that investigates the role of foreign ownership and FDI during
ﬁnancial crises. Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) investigate the response of sales, assets, and capital
expenditure of U.S. multinational aﬃliates and domestic ﬁrms in the aftermath of a variety of
ﬁnancial crises from 25 emerging market countries and ﬁnd that foreign aﬃliates outperform their
local counterparts across these performance measures. Their interpretation is that local ﬁrms are
constrained due to their limited access to ﬁnance. However, as they acknowledge, they are unable
to document the exact mechanism by which currency depreciations diﬀerentially intensify ﬁnancing
constraints since they lack data on the currency denomination of the debt. The paper by Blalock,
Gertler, and Levine (2008) extends the analysis of Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) by focusing solely
on exporting plants and investigate the role of foreign ownership for this group of establishments in
Indonesia. Their strategy allows identiﬁcation of the local ﬁrms who would beneﬁt most from the
currency devaluation.8 They reinforce the conclusion of Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) by showing
that foreign-owned exporters clearly increase investment relative to domestic exporters. Alfaro and
Chen (2010) using a world-wide dataset on multinational subsidiaries show that, establishments
sharing stronger vertical production and ﬁnancial linkages with the parent company increase sales
during the recent “Global Financial Crisis.”
All these results are consistent with the existence of ﬁnancial constraints but the source of the
constraint is not clear. It is possible that foreign-owned exporters have stronger balance sheets
through having less dollar denominated debt than their domestic counterparts. Alternatively they
may have more dollar denominated debt but at the same time they may have matching dollar
revenue from their exports. Or simply, foreigners might be better at managing their balance sheet.
In any of these cases foreign exporters will have higher net worth and will not be facing solvency
issues. This creates a selection problem, where certain ﬁrms with no solvency issues are in the
exporter sample, biasing results on export performance. Solving this selection bias caused by
omitting the balance-sheet weakness is at the heart of our paper.
8Note that Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) also investigate the diﬀerential impact of the depreciation on multina-
tionals that are export-oriented by proxying exports with sales from subsidiaries abroad. They did not ﬁnd a stronger
eﬀect though. In their analysis, multinational aﬃliates do better than local ﬁrms, regardless of the fact that they are
export-oriented.
7Thus, our paper is also related to the literature that investigates the eﬀect of foreign currency
borrowing and the associated weak balance sheets on ﬁrms’ investment. The work by Aguiar (2005)
shows that ﬁrms with heavy exposure to short-term foreign currency debt before the Mexican crisis
decreased investment compared to ﬁrms with lower dollar debt exposure. He shows an increase
in sales for both groups but a decrease in investment for the exposed group. Hence, his results
support the idea that weak balance sheets can hinder investment during a major currency crisis
episode. However, in a very similar study using a bigger sample of Latin American countries during
the period 1991–1999, Bleakley and Cowan (2008) show the opposite result focusing on total debt:
ﬁrms holding dollar debt invest more during exchange rate depreciations. They are the ﬁrst to argue
that ﬁrms match the currency composition of their liabilities with that of their income streams or
assets, avoiding insolvency during a currency depreciation. Our ﬁndings can bridge these two set
of studies and provide an explanation for seemingly conﬂicting results.
3 Data and Construction of Regression Variables
The empirical analysis draws on a unique database with accounting information for over 1,300
companies in six Latin American countries, spanning the period 1990 to 2005. The countries covered
are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The data was assembled from diﬀerent
sources.9 A distinct feature of this data is that it contains detailed information on the currency
and maturity composition of ﬁrms’ balance sheets, the breakdown of sales into domestic and export
revenues, ﬁrms’ foreign-ownership structure and other measures of access to international markets,
such as corporate bond issuances abroad. This issuance data is at transaction-level and obtained
from Dealogic database and includes ﬁrms’ bond and syndicated loan issuance.
Financial statement data was obtained from annual balance sheet reports drawn from local
stock markets and regulatory agencies in each country. Data on foreign currency liabilities and
assets (and their maturity structure) was hand-collected from the ﬁnancial explanatory notes of
ﬁrms’ balance sheets. These are all assets or liabilities outstanding which are denominated in -or
indexed to- foreign currency, issued domestically or abroad. In the case of liabilities, these include
bank loans, commercial debt, trade credit and foreign securities. Foreign currency assets include
cash, government securities indexed to the dollar, bank deposits abroad and overseas client credits.
While ﬁrms in many cases report both consolidated and unconsolidated ﬁnancial statements,
9Details of the data are provided in Appendix and further details in Kamil (2009).
8we use unconsolidated ﬁgures, to reduce variations arising from changes in subsidiaries’ ownership
and to avoid double counting. Information on ﬁrms’ export revenues was obtained from income
statement data. When this was not available, we used countries’ customs oﬃce records or Central
Bank’s Balance of Payments trade registries. In the latter case, we merged balance sheet information
with ﬁrms’ export sales using their tax code identiﬁer and/or name.
3.1 Investment
Our left hand side variable is investment in ﬁxed capital. The measure of investment used in
the empirical analysis is the annual change in the stock of physical capital scaled by total assets
to control for the ﬁrm size. This investment to asset ratio is winsorized at the lower and upper 1
percent level at the country level to control for outliers before it is used in the regression. The stock
of physical capital, in turn, is deﬁned as the sum of expenditures on property, plant, equipment, plus
technical reappraisal (valuation change), minus cumulated depreciation. We attempt to minimize
any exchange rate and valuation eﬀects by normalizing investment by total assets and including
country-year ﬁxed eﬀects, that will absorb common exchange rate ﬂuctuations and valuation eﬀects.
In addition, we try to minimize the eﬀects of accounting bias in the value of capital stock by
estimating the models with ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects.
3.2 Dollar Liabilities, Export Revenue and Tradable Sector
We measure dollar liabilities as the ratio of total dollar liabilities to total liabilities and short term
dollar liabilities as the ratio of short term dollar liabilities to total short term liabilities. Short-term
liabilities refer to outstanding debt that must be payed within 12 months. This measure includes
foreign currency denominated debt issued at short maturities as well as long-term issues whose
terminal date falls over the next 12 months.
The sources of foreign currency ﬁnancing diﬀer across countries. In Argentina, Chile, Mexico and
Peru ﬁrms can borrow in dollars from domestic banks. In the case of Colombia and Brazil, however,
most of companies’ foreign currency borrowing is obtained abroad (whether bond issuances, bank
loans or trade credit).10 This is because, in these countries, ﬁnancial dollarization is severely
restricted: on-shore foreign currency deposits are banned and private banks cannot lend in dollars.
In Colombia, ﬁrms cannot borrow in foreign currency from any type of bank (commercial or state-
owned). Therefore, ﬁrms located in Colombia can only raise foreign currency by issuing bonds,
10We thank Laura Alfaro for pointing this out.
9loans and equity abroad or through trade credit with foreign suppliers. In Brazil, ﬁrms that want
to borrow in foreign currency domestically can only do so through the state development bank
(BNDES) under stringent conditions. In fact, only exporters can borrow easily from BNDES by
pledging foreign currency revenue as collateral against dollar debt. Given the fact that we will focus
on exporters throughout our analysis, we do not worry about ﬁrms in Brazil holding signiﬁcantly
less foreign currency denominated debt than ﬁrms in the rest of our ﬁve Latin American countries.
As we show later, exporters hold more dollar debt than non-exporters across all our countries.
Exporter status deﬁned by export to sales ratio where sales is deﬁned as gross sales from main
operating activities. We also deﬁne two exporter dummy variables, one that takes the value of one
if the ﬁrm reported export revenue in a given year and zero otherwise. The second one aims to
identify exporters with a high exports to sales ratio, so that it takes the value of one if the ﬁrms’
export revenue represents more than 10 percent of the sales and zero otherwise. This is a substantial
improvement over previous studies in the literature that typically used aggregate variables to proxy
for ﬁrms’ access to foreign currency revenue (either a binary tradable/non-tradable classiﬁcation
or industry export shares).
To control for selection, we also deﬁne exporting ﬁrms based on a predetermined dummy vari-
able. A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as exporter if she reported export revenue at any time during the three
years prior to the ﬁrst crisis.11 In addition, given the severity of the banking crisis in Colombia,
exporters in this country are deﬁned based on whether the ﬁrm reported export revenue in 1995,
1996, or 1997 (three years prior to the banking crisis). In Peru and Chile where no substantial
banking crisis and/or currency crisis took place during our sample period, predetermined exporters
are deﬁned based on whether ﬁrms reported export revenue at any time during the period of anal-
ysis. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008) identify a banking crisis in Peru 1999 however, the decline in
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP was only of 3 percentage points between 1999
and 2000 and 5 percentage points between 1999 and 2001, as oppose to 50 percent decline in credit
to private sector in the case of Mexico.
3.3 Foreign Ownership
One of the contributions of our paper is to construct a continuous measure of foreign ownership for
each ﬁrm in our sample. Our indicator of foreign ownership is based on precise dates of ownership
11In the case of Argentina, we refer to years 1998, 1999 and 2000; Brazil 1996, 1997 and 1998; Mexico 1991, 1992
and 1993.
10changes, foreigner’s share in the ﬁrm and the nationality of the parent and global ultimate parent.
The continuous measure will allow us to explore the role of majority foreign-owned companies by
deﬁning a dummy variable that takes the value of one if foreigners own more than 50 percent of the
ﬁrm’s capital structure and zero otherwise. To check whether or not the results are driven by ﬁrms
becoming foreign-owned during the crises, we also deﬁne a predetermined foreign dummy variable
as in the case of exporters.
To identify the ownership structure of each ﬁrm in our sample and track their changes over time,
we proceed in two steps, where we provide details on the construction of the foreign ownership
variable in the appendix. First, we gathered data on all cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions
(M&A) of Latin-American ﬁrms between 1981 to 2005 using the SDC Platinum database from
Thompson (for the period 1981 to 2001) and Zephyr from Bureau Van Dijk (from 1997 to 2005).
We then identiﬁed all transactions where the target involved a ﬁrm in our sample. Examining M&As
from the 1980s onwards ensures that we capture any change in ownership relationship that predates
the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst appearance in our sample, that is 1990. For each deal, we obtained the date on which
the transaction became eﬀective and characteristics of the target and acquiring ﬁrms, in particular,
the nationality of the target and acquiring ﬁrm, and that of the ultimate parent. The database also
includes transaction-speciﬁc information on percent of shares acquired and the percent of shares
owned before and after the transaction was completed. In total, we consider 4,406 completed deals
that resulted in a change in majority control in a target ﬁrm in our sample as well as acquisitions
of minority stakes (some of which involve multiple acquisitions of the same target). Of the ﬁrms in
our sample, 28 percent were involved in at least one M&A during the period. For each ﬁrm involved
in an M&A, we constructed a continuous, time-varying measure of foreign ownership based on the
percentage fraction of shares held by foreign and domestic investors in each year.
As a result, the foreign ownership measure can take any value between 0 and 100 and represents
the percentage of capital owned by foreign investors at a given point in time. Figure 1 shows the
evolution of average foreign ownership over time in our sample, in a balanced panel. Many Latin
American countries underwent massive privatization processes during the 1990s. Therefore, as
expected, foreign ownership has steadily grown over time. Most of our sampled ﬁrms are domestic
and hence the distribution of foreign ownership has a high concentration of ﬁrms around zero, where
70 percent of the ﬁrms are domestic, as shown in Figure 2.12 Figure 3 shows that among those
ﬁrms with positive foreign ownership, 40 percent of the observations are between 85 percent and
100 percent foreign-owned. Hence foreign investors prefer to have a controlling stake in general.
12We choose 2000 for being an intermediate year but similar ﬁgures are obtained using any other year.
11These distributions look similar by country.
3.4 The Crises Episodes
Table 1 shows the currency crisis and banking crisis episodes for our sample of countries together
with percent changes in macro aggregates before, during and after the crisis episodes. Following
Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) we identify a currency crisis in a given year if the real exchange rate
increased by more than 25 percent with respect to the previous year. We identify four currency
crisis episodes in our sample: Mexico (1995), Brazil (1999), Brazil (2002), and Argentina (2002).13
Following Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008) we identify the following banking crises: Argentina (1995)
and (2001), Brazil (1995), Mexico (1994) and Colombia (1998). Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008) base
their classiﬁcation of banking crises on two types of events. First, they focus on bank runs that
lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more ﬁnancial institutions.
Second, in the absence of bank runs, according to their classiﬁcation, a banking crisis involves the
closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important ﬁnancial institution
(or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other ﬁnancial
institutions.
The banking crises in our analysis, Argentina (2001) and Mexico (1994) were precipitated by
diﬀerent events. In Argentina, in March 2001, a bank run started due to lack of public conﬁdence in
government policy actions. There was strong opposition from the public to the new ﬁscal austerity
package sent to the Congress and the amendment to the convertibility law (change in parity from
being pegged to the dollar, to being pegged to a basket composed of the US dollar and Euro) as
described in Laeven and Valencia (2008). As a result of the bank run, partial withdrawal restrictions
were imposed (corralito) and ﬁxed-term deposits (CDs) were reprogrammed to stop outﬂows from
banks (corralon). In Mexico the 1994 banking crisis had diﬀerent origins. Until 1991 banks were
nationalized. With the privatization process in 1991-1992, investors with scarce previous experience
in banking wanting to quickly recover their investment extended large amounts of loans without a
proper credit risk analysis. This behavior, together with the stagnation of real estate prices and
13All four episodes implied a considerable depreciation of the real exchange rate, the two episodes in Brazil amounted
to a 34 percent depreciation while Mexico witnessed a 47 percent depreciation and Argentina 96 percent. Notice
Mexico abandoned the peg in December 1994 and consequently the end-of year exchange rate only depreciated
between December 94 and December 95. As expected we do not observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the investment
rates of foreign-owned exporters relative to domestic exporters during 1994 when the exchange rate had not yet
depreciated, since no new investment opportunity had arisen.
12the increase in US real interest rates eroded banks’ balance sheets. In 1994, 9out of 34 banks
were intervened and 11 banks participated in the loan/purchase recapitalization program of 34
commercial banks. The 9 banks accounted for 19 percent of the ﬁnancial system assets.
Table 1 shows that, in terms of macroeconomic preconditions in these countries at the time of
the crisis, with the exception of Argentina, the other countries were showing similar growth rates of
GDP, investment and trade balance. All these percent changes are averages over two years. During
and post crisis experiences diﬀer from country to country, showing the importance of including
country-year eﬀects. A common feature of recovery in all countries is the increase in investment
and exports leading to a positive growth in the trade balance.
3.5 Sample Selection
All ﬁrms in the sample are publicly-traded companies. Following previous research, we excluded
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Focusing solely on publicly listed ﬁrms was dictated by data availability, and has the
disadvantage that the patterns observed for publicly traded ﬁrms might not be representative of the
corporate sector as a whole. Yet, it has the advantage that ﬁnancial statistics being more accurate
and comprehensive. Moreover, relative to other available databases the coverage of small and
medium-sized publicly traded ﬁrms is better since we have the whole universe of listed ﬁrms. The
database covers all ﬁrms that are listed -or have been listed- in the six countries’ stock exchanges,
rather than just the most liquid or with the biggest market capitalization, as has been common in
other data sets used widely in cross-country studies such as Worldscope.
Most of our variables are expressed as ratios; where this is not the case, we deﬂate the nominal
magnitudes with 2000 values using December-to-December changes in the consumer price index and
converting them to U.S. dollars using December 2000 market exchange rates. Since we identify of
oﬀ time variation we exclude all ﬁrms with non-consecutive yearly observations (i.e, which appear
disappear and reappear in the sample), which constitute 10 percent of the sampled ﬁrms. The size
of the sample changes as new ﬁrms enter and exit the sample. Only less than 10 percent of the
ﬁrms delisted and hence we believe the survivorship bias is negligible.14
This cleaning procedure outlined in the appendix leave us with complete information for an
14In order to explore sample bias due to delisting/bankruptcy we look at the original sample that included all ﬁrms
that were listed at some point in any of these Latin American countries. In Mexico 1995 and Brazil 1999 none of
the ﬁrms delisted due to a change in ownership. In Argentina 2002 and Brazil 2002 only one of the delisting ﬁrms
actually changed ownership status the ﬁrst year of the crisis.
13unbalanced panel of 6,175 ﬁrm-year observations, which consist of 931 ﬁrms with an average of
around 7 years each. Finally, data on additional controls included later on in the estimation leaves
us with a sample of 5,063 observations or 864 ﬁrms.
3.6 Descriptive Statistics
Although our sample is restricted to listed companies there is nevertheless great heterogeneity
across ﬁrms regarding whether a ﬁrm exports or not, their foreign debt holdings and the degree of
foreign ownership. Table 2 reports the percentage of observations by type of ﬁrm, averaged over
our sample period. Foreign is a dummy that takes the value of one if the company is majority
owned (more than 50 percent) by a foreign investor and zero otherwise. In Argentina 53 percent
of the sampled ﬁrms are foreign-owned while in Colombia only 16 percent would be considered
foreign-owned. Another important variable in our analysis is export status. Around 56 percent of
the observations report some export revenue and half of those observations report a ratio of export
revenue to sales greater than 10 percent. Regarding dollar assets and liabilities, 81 percent of the
sample reports some positive debt holding denominated in foreign currency while only 59 percent
of the sample reports positive dollar assets. Again these ﬁgures vary by country. In Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico and Peru, we have a greater number of observations with positive values of dollar
debt.
There is also extensive variation in the main variables used in the analysis. Table 3 reports
summary statistics for these variables. On average ﬁrms hold 26 percent of their short-term debt
denominated in foreign currency while exporters hold on average higher values of their debt de-
nominated in foreign currency (35 percent). 20 percent of total liabilities correspond to short-term
bank debt and exporters seem to exhibit only a slightly higher dependence on short-term bank debt
at 22 percent. Finally, bonds and equity issuance abroad is limited at 2 percent and loan issuance
abroad is only 5 percent. Appendix Table A1 shows correlations.
There is also great heterogeneity in dollar debt holdings across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. This is
the crucial variation that we exploit in the paper. Table 4 shows that on average exporters hold
more dollar debt than non-exporting ﬁrms. Moreover, foreign-owned and domestic exporters hold
similar average ratios of short-term debt denominated in foreign currency. However, there is great
variation across countries. While in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, foreign-owned exporters hold
a higher share of their short-term debt denominated in dollars than domestic exporters, in Mexico
and Peru domestic exporters show a higher tendency to hold short-term dollar denominated debt.
144 Identication Strategy
Our objective is twofold: We want to identify whether ﬁnancial crises translate into lower ﬁrm-level
investment, and, if so, through which channel this happens. The main challenge to identiﬁcation
is to separate the demand for credit by ﬁrms from the supply of credit by banks, holding ﬁrm
creditworthiness constant. Exploiting ﬁrm-level variation during diﬀerent type of crises that moves
demand and supply for credit in opposite direction is key for our identiﬁcation. A currency crisis
is a positive demand shock for exporters and a banking crisis is a negative supply shock.
Currency crises can also impact ﬁrms’ creditworthiness by inﬂating the value of dollar denom-
inated debt holdings. In order to account for the balance sheet channel we incorporate into the
analysis the dollar debt holdings of these exporting ﬁrms. Exporting ﬁrms without dollar debt
holdings would not experience a decrease in net worth due to a depreciated currency. The decline
in net worth experienced by exporting ﬁrms holding dollar debt would ultimately depend on their
ability to match dollar denominated income (exports) and dollar debt holdings. As a result, we
focus on the sample of exporting ﬁrms that are the ones expected to increase investment and at
the same time have the opportunity to avoid a mismatch on their balance sheet. Table 4 shows
that the median exporting ﬁrm holds on average 31 percent of short-term debt denominated in
foreign currency while the median non-exporting ﬁrm holds less than 1 percent of the short-term
debt denominated in dollars (notice the high variation across countries).
Regarding the liquidity channel, we exploit both country and ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. We ob-
serve more than one depreciation episode and some of these episodes are combined with banking
crises. Hence, all the currency crises episodes share the depreciation of the currency and conse-
quently, a potential balance sheet weakness. However, in some of the depreciation episodes there is
in addition, an economy-wide liquidity shock resulting from the troubled domestic banking sector
(these are the so-called twin crises episodes). As argued by Kaminsky (2006) not all currency crises
are the same. Twin and currency crises are diﬀerent treatment events. They are both characterized
by the depreciation of the currency but in addition, twin crises involve a general dry up of available
funds. During twin crises, even ﬁrms that do not experience a deterioration of their net worth
might have diﬃculties in accessing external ﬁnancial resources and therefore invest less.
We exploit ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in liquidity under diﬀerent crisis episodes utilizing data on
the ownership structure of the ﬁrm. As discussed before, several recent papers have shown that
foreign-owned companies outperform domestic companies during ﬁnancial crises. This evidence is
consistent with an access to ﬁnance explanation where foreign-owned ﬁrms outperform the domes-
15tic counterparts during a crisis given their connections to international ﬁnancial markets and/or
deeper internal capital markets. An alternative explanation for the higher investment of foreign-
owned ﬁrms is that these ﬁrms may not suﬀer from weak balance sheets since they are insulated
from exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Our identiﬁcation strategy will allow us to disentangle these two
sources of liquidity constraints, insolvency versus illiquidity. We compare investment of foreign-
owned exporting ﬁrms with dollar debt holdings to that of domestic exporting ﬁrms who also have
dollar debt holdings. This will allow us to identify the exact mechanism for the ﬁnancial con-
straint. Conditional on the assumption that during a currency crisis the ﬁnancial sector does not
face liquidity constraints, we should observe no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between foreign-owned and
domestic exporting ﬁrms holding their creditworthiness constant. During a twin crisis, on the other
hand, foreign-owned exporting ﬁrms should outperform domestic exporting ﬁrms since domestic
ﬁrms that are heavily reliant on the domestic banking system will witness a sharp decline in the
availability of credit. Our data on bank dependence (i.e., the ratio of short-term bank debt to
total liabilities) conﬁrm that on average the ratio of short-term bank debt to total liabilities for
exporting ﬁrms is 16 percent while that of high exporters is 25 percent. This is in line with the
channel outlined in Amiti and Weinstein (2011) where exporting ﬁrms rely heavily on short-term
debt for operation. Within the sample of high exporters there are no major signiﬁcant diﬀerences
across domestic and foreign-owned companies regarding their reliance on short-term bank debt
(both types of ﬁrms show a bank dependence ratio of around 24 percent).15 Despite the similar
reliance of domestic and foreign-owned companies on bank credit, which conﬁrms the suitability
of comparing these ﬁrms, foreign-owned exporting ﬁrms would still have access to international
ﬁnancial markets either directly or through the parent company.
A critical assumption for our study is that banks are illiquid only during twin crises and not
during currency crises. Notice that our results do not rest on the very strict form of this assumption.
We only need banks to be relatively more illiquid during twin crises compared to currency crises.
Since the seminal work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), there has been an extensive literature
highlighting the role of a troubled banking sector that turns a currency crisis into a twin crisis.
This is especially relevant for emerging markets where stock and bond markets are less developed
and banks are the main source of credit. Therefore, bank illiquidity means a halt in domestic credit
provision. Banks can also be insolvent if they have a balance-sheet mismatch of their own. For our
purposes of focusing on the real eﬀects of the crisis, where the investment decision is taken by the
15Notice that we are not able to determine whether the bank debt is from domestic or international banks that
might be more or less exposed to the national country shock
16ﬁrm, the key factor is whether or not banks can provide liquidity to ﬁrms, regardless of whether
they are themselves illiquid or insolvent. The extensive literature on the bank lending channel also
provides evidence on the causal link between a negative shock to banks and the credit provision to
ﬁrms in a developing country context, as reviewed in section 2. The critical issue here is that all
the banking crises predate the currency crises and were not originated by ﬁrm bankruptcy, which
was the case as discussed in section 3.4. If banks become insolvent under a currency crisis and
halt domestic credit provision as much as in the case of a twin crisis, then our ﬁrm-level access
to ﬁnance measure –foreign ownership– should not have diﬀerential explanatory power among the
types of crisis, i.e., domestic ﬁrms should do worse than foreign-owned ﬁrms under both types of
crisis.
Figure 4 demonstrates the case in point and shows that in our sample, countries that experienced
a twin crisis witnessed a signiﬁcant decline in domestic credit provision, whereas this did not happen
in countries that went thorough currency crisis episodes. The top left panel shows domestic credit
to the private sector (as a percent of GDP) in Chile, a country that had no crises during our sample
period. The top right panel shows the case of Colombia, who had a banking crisis in 1998. The
15 percentage point decline in domestic credit is clearly visible. The bottom left panel shows the
case of Mexico where the banking crisis of 1994 is followed by the currency crisis in 1995. Again
domestic credit as percent of GDP dropped sharply, corresponding to a 50 percent decline in credit
provision to the private sector. Finally, the bottom right panel represents Brazil who did not suﬀer
from a collapse in bank lending during the currency crises of 1999 and 2002.16
For our identiﬁcation strategy, summarized above, we need to run a triple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
speciﬁcation that we estimate for the sample of exporting ﬁrms:
16Notice the beginning of the 90s was a very turbulent period in Brazil. Inﬂation was rampant with a peak of
82.4 percent in March 1990. A new government designed a stabilization program, Plano Real, aimed to reduced
ﬁscal deﬁcit and introduced a new currency. During the 1980s, banks acted as intermediaries of the public sector
debt and beneﬁted from high inﬂation and indexation. To avoid reducing their proﬁts once inﬂation was brought
down, banks initially expanded credit (mostly through consumer and commercial loans). Although the new currency
brought down inﬂation, it could not prevent the banking crisis in 1995. The sharp decline in domestic credit to the
private sector is clear from Figure 4. The scale does not show the 15 percentage point decline in credit from 1995 to
1998 and the subsequent slightly increase from 1998 to 1999. Similarly, prior to the currency crisis of 2002, domestic
credit to GDP slightly increased.
17yi;c;j;t = β1Foreigni;c;j;t 1  SDDebti;c;j;t 1  Postc;t (1)
+ β2Foreigni;c;j;t 1  SDDebti;c;j;t 1
+ β3Foreigni;c;j;t 1  Postc;t
+ β4SDDebti;c;j;t 1  Postc;t
+ β5Foreigni;c;j;t 1
+ β6SDDebti;c;j;t 1
+ ϕj;t + φc;t + αi + ξi;c;j;t
where yi;c;j;t is the outcome of ﬁrm i, in country c, in sector j at time t. For the outcome variables,
we use sales and investment scaled by total assets to control for ﬁrm size.
Foreign can be used as a continuous variable and also as a dummy that takes the value of one
if the company is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. SDDebt measures lagged short-term dollar
denominated liabilities, which are liabilities with residual maturity of twelve months. We focus
on short-term debt since as mentioned in the introduction, the literature argues that this is the
most relevant variable determining balance sheet mismatch vulnerability (See Setser et al. 2005).17
Post is the depreciation dummy and equals to one in the year of crisis and one year after. We
include ϕj;t that controls for sector-year ﬁxed eﬀects, φc;t that captures country-year ﬁxed eﬀects,
αi are ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects, and ξi;c;j;t is the error term.18 By using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects we will be
identifying solely from ﬁrm changes over time. Country-year eﬀects will absorb the eﬀects of any
other macroeconomic shock.
The triple interaction turns out to be crucial in correctly identifying the groups of ﬁrms that will
beneﬁt or will be hurt by the crisis. To see why, we compare the interpretation of the coeﬃcients
in equation (1) to those that would result from estimating the following equation:
17We have also experimented with the ratio of short-term dollar debt in total debt obtaining similar results. The
correlation between the two is 0.87.
18Notice that the Post dummy is captured in the country-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Time dummies are also absorbed by
this ﬁxed eﬀect.
18yi;c;j;t = β3Foreigni;c;j;t 1  Postc;t (2)
+ β4SDDebti;c;j;t 1  Postc;t
+ β5Foreigni;c;j;t 1
+ β6SDDebti;c;j;t 1
+ ϕj;t + φc;t + αi + ξi;c;j;t
In equation (1), β4 is the eﬀect of holding dollar debt after the crisis only for the sample of
domestic exporting ﬁrms. This is not the case for β4 in equation (2) since now this coeﬃcient will
reﬂect a combined eﬀect of foreign-owned and domestic exporting ﬁrms. Similarly, β3 in equation
(1) captures the investment behavior of foreign-owned exporting companies with no dollar debt
relative to those foreign-owned exporting companies with dollar debt at the time of the crisis, β1.
Compared to equation (2) the advantage is that the coeﬃcient β3 in equation (1) does not confound
the eﬀect of foreign-owned exporting companies holding and not holding dollar debt as it would be
the case of the coeﬃcient β3 in equation (2).
If exporting ﬁrms match their dollar holdings with export revenue, we expect β4 in equation
(1) to be insigniﬁcant since domestic exporting ﬁrms who hold dollar debt should not perform
diﬀerently than foreign-owned exporting ﬁrms with dollar debt. We expect them both to have
strong balance-sheets as a result of matching their dollar debt to their export revenue. Hence, β1
compared to β4 is the incremental eﬀect of being a foreign-owned company among exporting ﬁrms
holding dollar debt. If β1 > β4 (i.e., foreign-owned exporting ﬁrms holding dollar debt outperform
domestic exporters holding dollar debt) we interpret this as the “access to ﬁnance” eﬀect or evidence
for the liquidity channel. Both foreign-owned and domestic exporting ﬁrms experience a similar
change in their net worth but foreign-owned exporting ﬁrms manage to increase investment relative
to domestic exporting ﬁrms. This means that there is something diﬀerent about foreign-owned
exporting ﬁrms with dollar debt at the time of the crisis. Our interpretation of this diﬀerence is
access to external funds. The potential ﬁnding β1 < β3 (i.e., foreign-owned exporting ﬁrms with
dollar debt under performing relative to foreign-owned exporters without dollar debt holdings)
would highlight the importance of insolvency since comparing ﬁrms that have the best access to
liquidity (i.e., foreign-owned companies), those with a deterioration in their balance sheet would
under perform.
19Therefore, to summarize, if both foreign-owned and domestic exporters with dollar debt holdings
can avoid a mismatch on their balance-sheet and hence insolvency, then the diﬀerential response
between the two captures access to liquidity. This result should only hold when domestic companies
suﬀer from a liquidity problem. Hence, we should see foreign-owned exporters with dollar debt
investing more relative to domestic exporters with dollar debt holdings only under twin crises. This
can only be done by means of a triple interaction rather than a double interaction that would mask
the groups of interest. In addition, one of the key advantages of this speciﬁcation is that it allows
to quantify the total eﬀect of dollar debt holdings and identify those ﬁrms that are beneﬁted/hurt
by the crisis. Finally, the identiﬁcation strategy relies on the fact that there are no prior diﬀerential
trends in outcomes of foreign versus domestic exporters with dollar debt, especially during a twin
crisis. Our robustness section will show this is indeed the case. Next, we turn to our regression
analysis.
5 Results
Table 5 shows the results from estimating equation (1) for the sample of exporting ﬁrms.19 Following
Aguiar (2005), an exporter is deﬁned as a ﬁrm whose export revenue to sales ratio is more than
10 percent. The 10 percent cut oﬀ level corresponds to the 75 percentile of the distribution of
exports to sales ratio. The main reasoning behind choosing this sample is to consider ﬁrms with
enough export revenue to compensate any potential mismatch derived from dollar debt holdings.
According to our estimation strategy, columns (1) to (4) of Table 5 concentrate on the twin crises
episodes, (i.e., Argentina (2002) and Mexico (1995) where both countries had a banking crises in
the year prior to the currency crisis). Columns (5) to (8) refer to the currency crises episodes (i.e.,
Brazil (1999, 2002) which involved a depreciation of the currency of more than 25 percent but there
was not a decline in the supply of credit (see Figure 4)).20
Column (1) in Table 5 shows our main result: foreign-owned exporters holding dollar debt
increase investment (0.211) relative to domestic exporters holding dollar debt (-0.150) and foreign-
owned exporters with no dollar debt (0.127) during twin crises. On the contrary, column (5) shows
19In order to properly implement country-year and sector-year ﬁxed eﬀects in the presence of triple interactions
and continuous variables, through out the analysis we demean all continuous variables by removing country-year and
sector-year averages from ﬁrm-level values.
20Notice the post dummy always refers to the year of depreciation and year after. Given that the treatment is
based on a time dummy, standard errors are clustered at the year level throughout the analysis. However, similar
results where obtained for most speciﬁcations when clustering at the country level.
20that foreign-owned exporters holding dollar debt (-0.068) do not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerently
than domestic exporters with dollar debt (0.053) or foreign-owned exporters without dollar debt
(-0.033) during currency crises. Notice that according to the F-test in column (5) the total eﬀect
from dollar debt or foreign ownership is not signiﬁcant during the currency crises years. In fact
none of the total eﬀects are signiﬁcant under currency crisis episodes.
Columns (2) and (6) show similar results when the exporting sample is deﬁned according to
whether the ﬁrm reported export revenue that accounted for more than 10 percent of sales during
the three years prior to the crises. The recent literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade shows
that it is most productive ﬁrms that enter the export market and among those, only the ones
with the highest productivity will engage in FDI activities (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)).
Therefore, the depreciation episode would make ﬁrms near the threshold productivity cut-oﬀ level
enter the export market. These ﬁrms would be more productive than the non exporting ones but
less productive than the ones that were already exporting. Changes in export status from non-
exporter to exporter at the time of the crisis were relatively limited in our sample and accounted
for 5 percent of the exporting observations at the time of the crisis. These ﬁndings are similar to
those in Gopinath and Neiman (2011) that show how during the 2002 Argentinean ﬁnancial crisis
there was not a signiﬁcant change in the number of exported varieties.21 Nevertheless, to avoid
concerns about selection into the export market at the time of the crises columns (2) to (4) and
(6) to (8) use a predetermined export dummy to deﬁne the exporter sample.
We include in all columns ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables to account for the following concerns.
First, dollar debt holdings might not be an issue if the ﬁrm is not leveraged, i.e, the short-term
debt might not be a big fraction of total debt, then it would not be a concern even if most of the
short-term debt is denominated in dollars. This type of ﬁrm may not face an insolvency problem.
Second, we assume that ﬁrms in countries that experienced a twin crisis cannot ﬁnance investment
and/or working capital at the time of the crisis through banks. Several studies have highlighted
the dependence of ﬁrms on the local banking system in Latin America, such as Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2001). Therefore, we control for the ratio of short-term bank debt to total liabilities
to proxy for bank dependence and leverage, which enters as negative and signiﬁcant. Third, we
also assume that ﬁrms are not able to borrow in international markets at the time of the crisis.
21Gopinath and Neiman (2011) also show that the extensive margin of imports played a small role during the
2002 Argentinean crisis and it was mainly driven by small importers. However, the churning of inputs within ﬁrms
played a sizeable role in aggregate adjustment. For our purposes the important ﬁnding is that they show how these
diﬀerences are not driven by diﬀerences between domestic and MNCs.
21This is a typical characteristic of emerging market crises where foreign investors are dissuaded by
the bad economic conditions of any lending to these ﬁrms in the eve of or during the crisis. To
check this, using data from Dealogic Bondware and Loanware, we include measures of access to
international markets like “bond abroad” dummy that takes the value of one in the year the ﬁrm
issues a corporate bond abroad, “international loan” dummy that takes the value of one in the
year the ﬁrm issues a syndicated loan abroad, and “equity abroad” dummy that takes the value of
one in the year the ﬁrm issues stock abroad (either as ADR or GDR, whether in the US or other
stock market). Although these measures are good proxies for external sources of ﬁnancing during
tranquil times we believe these measures will be relatively weak during ﬁnancial turbulent times as
argued by the sudden stop literature since markets shy away from emerging markets during such
times (see for example Calvo and Mendoza (2001) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2010)). Indeed
these measures turn out to be insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. We rely on foreign ownership as a
main arms’ length source of ﬁnancing for foreign aﬃliates located in emerging markets, especially
during ﬁnancial crises.
A potential threat to a proper identiﬁcation arises from the possibility that productive ﬁrms
are bought out by foreigners during the crisis although the evidence so far seems to be showing the
opposite. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) show that foreign investors buy inferior ﬁrms at ﬁre-sale
prices. Nevertheless, we deﬁne foreign status as a dummy based on the ownership status of the
ﬁrm three years prior to the crisis in columns (3) and (7). Clearly, the results are not sensitive to
the way foreign and export status are deﬁned. This is expected since although, there are 17 cases
in which a domestic ﬁrms changed ownership status to majority foreign-owned at the time of the
devaluation in the total sample, in the exporter subsample there are only 7 of such cases. Finally,
columns (4) and (8) explore whether the results could be driven by foreign-owned ﬁrms being on
a diﬀerent trend than domestic ﬁrms. To shed some light on this possibility columns (4) and (8)
add foreign-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The results stay the same.
If insolvency through a worsening of the balance sheet was the dominant channel hindering
investment we should observe no diﬀerence between foreign-owned and domestic exporters that
hold dollar debt under any type of crisis. Clearly, foreign-owned ﬁrms do not suﬀer an illiquidity
problem during a twin crisis and do better relative to domestic exporters, regardless of their solvency
issues. The results imply sizeable impact. Results in column (1) indicate that comparing a domestic
exporter in the 90th percentile of the distribution of short-term dollar debt to a domestic exporter
in the 10th percentile, implies a decrease of investment of 11 percentage points for the former. At
the same time, a foreign exporter experiencing a similar increase in the short-term dollar debt ratio
22would have increased investment by 15 percentage points relative to a domestic exporter. These
eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant especially given the variation absorbed by the battery of ﬁxed
eﬀects.
6 Robustness and Threats to Identication
6.1 Robustness
We conduct a series of robustness checks for our main results obtained in column (4) of Table 5
and present the results in Table 6.
First, although we have emphasized the role of hard currency denominated income as the
main channel to avoid balance sheet mismatches, there are other factors that can contribute to
improve ﬁrms’ solvency. The potential negative eﬀect of foreign denominated short-term liabilities
on ﬁrms’ balance-sheets during crises could be mitigated by signiﬁcant holdings of foreign currency
denominated assets. Column (1) shows that results are robust to controlling for dollar assets as
a share of total assets during crises. Notice ideally we would like to control for the share of short
term dollar assets denominated in foreign currency however, this will severely limit the sample.
Thus, we control for cash holdings in column (2) instead since the increase in debt service via the
inﬂated dollar denominated debt would not translate into a balance sheet worsening if ﬁrms hold
enough cash. Our main results are not aﬀected.
Columns (3) and (4) look at other measures of leverage. All the results in Table 5 controlled for
the ratio of short term bank debt to total liabilities. Similarly, column (3) adds the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets and column (4) the ratio of long term bank debt to total liabilities, with
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on our main results.
Another possible explanation for the higher investment of foreign-owned exporters with dollar
debt relative to domestic exporters holding dollar debt is that foreign-owned exporters had better
access to export markets. As already mentioned we do not ﬁnd many companies starting to export
as a result of the devaluation (only 5 percent of the exporting observations at the time of the
crises). However, it might be that foreign-owned exporters have better connections or information
about international markets and are better able to increase their sales abroad. This eﬀect would
be absorbed by the foreign-year eﬀects. We also worry that due to contagion eﬀects, exporters in
the crisis country do not face a relative improvement in their investment prospects if exporters in
neighboring countries undergo a parallel depreciation (relevant for Argentina and Brazil (2002)) or
23if the instability in the area reduces the demand for imports from the crisis country. However, there
is no reason to believe that foreign and domestic exporters serve diﬀerent markets (unfortunately
we do not have ﬁrm-level data on the destination of exports).22
Finally, it is also possible that both foreign-owned and domestic ﬁrms reduce their dollar liabil-
ities in anticipation to the crisis. This can explain the no-diﬀerence result between foreign-owned
and domestic exporting ﬁrms in the case of currency crises. Thus, we show in Figure 5, that there
was no systematic decrease in dollarization for foreign-owned ﬁrms relative to domestic ﬁrms in
the eve of crisis. Nevertheless, we repeat our basic results using a predetermined dummy for dollar
debt holdings. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as having high dollar debt if her share of short term dollar debt
in total short term debt is greater than 35 percent at any time during the three years prior to the
crises.23 Results (available upon request) conﬁrm that our main results are not driven by foreigners
decreasing dollar debt holdings faster at the time of the crisis.
6.2 Threats to Identication
Given our diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy we might have several threats to identiﬁcation. Foreign-
owned exporters that choose to hold dollar denominated debt could be diﬀerent from domestic
exporters that chose to do so, irrespective of the depreciation, and these diﬀerences might be
correlated with investment rates. In practice, most of the ﬁrm unobservable characteristics are
time invariant and therefore, this concern should be lessened by the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. As
shown before our results are also robust to controlling for foreign-year ﬁxed eﬀects to account for
diﬀerent trends between foreign-owned and domestic companies. In addition, the triple interaction
regression controls for the term ShortDollarDebtPost which accounts for the diﬀerent trends in
investment between exporters holding dollar debt and those not holding dollar debt, at the time
of the crisis. Nevertheless, Figure 6 shows the average investment rates for two types of ﬁrms:
foreign-owned exporters holding above median dollar debt and domestic exporters holding above
median dollar debt in Mexico. Graphical inspection reveals that there are no major diﬀerences in
22An alternative explanation for the better investment of foreign-owned exporters is related to the role of imported
materials. Although the depreciation makes exported goods relatively cheaper, ﬁrms importing materials from abroad
would now witness an increase in the relative price of imports. Unfortunately, we could not obtain data on imports.
Nevertheless, to test for this possibility, we deﬁned tradable sectors with a dummy variable that is equal to one if
the ﬁrm operates in a SIC sector classiﬁed as tradable (see Forbes, 2002), and obtained similar results. The lack of
data prevents us from exploring the possibility that foreign-owned exporters have access to cheaper imported goods
through the parent company.
23Recall 35 percent corresponds to the mean holdings in the exporter sample.
24trends between foreign and domestic ﬁrms holding high levels short-term dollar debt prior to the
depreciation episode in Mexico.
Similarly, results are based on the assumption that ﬁrms across countries freely choose the
percentage of their short-term debt that is denominated in foreign currency. We do not want
our results to be driven by diﬀerences across countries in dollar debt practices. As we explained in
detail in the data section most of Brazilian companies foreign currency borrowing is obtained abroad
(whether bond issuances or bank loans). Exporters can borrow from the BNDES in foreign currency
though. In fact, Table 4 shows that although lower than the Argentinean and Mexican levels, short-
term dollar debt in Brazil represents on average 20 percent of short-term debt. Most importantly,
most of the variation in short-term dollar debt takes place within the sample of exporters (i.e.
non-exporting companies do not hold signiﬁcant amounts of dollar debt) which is our sample of
interest given that they are the ones faced with the investment opportunity. Although the median
domestic exporter in Brazil holds lower levels of dollar debt than the foreign-owned counterpart,
so do Argentinean domestic exporters and it does not seem to be something speciﬁc to Brazil.
A related issue is whether we can directly compare twin and currency crises. According to
Kaminsky (2006) crises are the result of diﬀerent factors that might question the suitability of
comparing crises that were not originated from the same economic failure. Kaminsky (2006) iden-
tiﬁes 6 diﬀerent types of currency crises according to the way in which they were generated. Four
of the categories are associated with domestic economic fragility, with vulnerabilities related to
current account deterioration, ﬁscal imbalances, ﬁnancial excesses, or foreign debt unsustainability.
But crises can also be provoked by just adverse world market conditions, such as the reversal of
international capital ﬂows. The so-called sudden-stop phenomenon identiﬁes the ﬁfth variety of
crises. As emphasized by the second generation models, crises also happen in economies with im-
maculate fundamentals. Thus, the last variety of crises is labeled self-fulﬁlling crises. She classiﬁes
both Brazil 1999 and Mexico 1995 as being the result of the same cause: ﬁnancial excesses.
Table 7 repeats the main speciﬁcation in Table 5 by country and episode. Column (1) shows
that foreign-owned exporters holding dollar debt in Mexico are the ones increasing investment
relative to domestic exporters with dollar debt (although the total eﬀects are not signiﬁcant in this
case notice that we are dealing with a small sample size). Column (2) examines the case of Brazil
1999 and as expected there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between domestic and foreign exporters
holding dollar debt. Therefore, comparing columns (1) and (2) we can say that results are robust
to focusing on currency crises that share the same origin and are not driven by the diﬀerent nature
of the depreciation but rather by the existence of a banking crisis in the preceding year. For
25completeness column (3) shows the case of Brazil 2002 where as expected there are no diﬀerences
across foreign-owned and domestic exporters with dollar debt.
6.3 Alternative Estimation Strategy
The results in Table 5 are consistent with the interpretation that the real problem is illiquidity. To
further substantiate this point we propose an alternative speciﬁcation instead of a triple interaction.
This strategy involves deﬁning a sample of solvent ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms with high leverage and holdings
of short-term foreign currency denominated debt that are not matched by a dollar denominated
stream of income like export revenue). Table 8 shows how foreign-owned ﬁrms perform relative
to domestic ﬁrms when we focus in a sample of ﬁrms with no currency mismatch. To avoid any
selection issues at the time of the crisis, we deﬁne matched balance sheets based on whether the
ﬁrm had revenue in excess to short-term dollar liabilities at any time during the three years prior
to the crises.24 Columns (1) to (3) show the results under twin crises while columns (4) to (6)
refer to currency crises. Column (1) shows how foreign-owned ﬁrms invest 5 percentage points
more relative to domestic ﬁrms during twin crises. It is reassuring that results are robust to the
use of a predetermined variable that classiﬁes ﬁrms into foreign-owned and domestic according to
their ownership status three years before the crises (see columns (2) and (3)). Finally, column (3)
examines the sample of exporters. Within solvent ﬁrms we expect exporting ﬁrms to be the ones
taking the investment opportunity generated by the depreciation of the currency. To avoid concerns
about selection into the export market at the time of the crises column (3) uses a predetermined ex-
port dummy to deﬁne the exporter sample. Within this sample of solvent exporters, foreign-owned
exporters increase investment by 8 percentage points relative to domestic exporters.25 In addition,
these columns show that results are robust to controlling for measure of access to international
markets. It seems to be the case in which parent companies inject liquidity into foreign-owned
ﬁrms during crises.26
24We deﬁne ﬁrms with no mismatch as those in which
Exports ShortDollarLiab
Assets  0. Notice we control for leverage
in all the columns in Table 8. Appendix Table A2 shows similar regression in total sample of ﬁrms.
25The earlier estimate of 15 percentage points raise in investment of foreign-owned exporters was calculated based
on the 10th to 90th percentile change in short term dollar debt.
26The Argentina Renault is a case in point. In 2001, the parent ﬁrm contributed $300 million to assure the survival
of its aﬃliate. In January 2003 it received an additional $160 million from parent Renault to accommodate its bank
creditors. The company lost $71 million in 2003 and ended the year with debt of about $276 million. However, during
the ﬁrst half of 2004, the company made a small proﬁt.
266.4 The Role of Exporters: Reconciling with the Literature
Finally, we would like to explore previous seemingly conﬂicting results in the literature and argue
that proper measurement of access to international liquidity via foreign ownership can account for
those ﬁndings.
First, we would like to establish whether or not exporters are ﬁnancially constrained in the
aftermath of a crisis. We do this by estimating the following equation:
yi;c;j;t = β1(ExportSharei;c;j;t 1  Postc;t) + β2ExportSharei;c;j;t 1 + ϕj;t + φc;t + αi + ξi;c;j;t (3)
ExportShare refers to the lagged ratio of export revenue to sales. Instead of lagged ratio we use
a predetermined export dummy in the regressions below, where exporter is deﬁned according to
whether the ﬁrm reported export revenue at any time during the three years prior to the crises,
obtaining similar results. The rest of the notation is same as in equation (1).
The traditional textbook theory on the eﬀect of exchange rate depreciations on output, con-
cludes that the depreciation episode should increase sales and investment of exporting ﬁrms due
to a competitiveness eﬀect. The literature generally ﬁnds that this is not the case, as shown in
column (1) of Table 9. There might be various explanations why exporters do not increase in-
vestment in the aftermath of currency crises such as adjustment costs and the role of inventories.
The literature has suggested ﬁnancial constraints as a major reason for exporters not undertaking
new investment during ﬁnancial crises. Column (2) includes short-term dollar debt as a control for
ﬁnancial constraints but the result do not change. Notice that we would have expected a positive
coeﬃcient on the export propensity variable once dollar debt holdings were taken into account if
the associated mismatch on the balance sheet was the reason hindering investment on the part of
exporters. However, this is not the case, suggesting that controlling for dollar debt holdings is not
enough to explain the investment behavior of exporters during crises. The result in column (2) is
consistent with Aguiar (2005).
Columns (3) and (4) investigate the role of diﬀerent crises: under currency crises, where there are
no liquidity constraints, exporters do increase investment however, under twin crises exporters do
not do better than non exporters (conditional on dollar debt). Why do exporters behave diﬀerently
during twin and currency crises and second, why ﬁrms holding higher levels of short term dollar
denominated debt decrease investment in the aftermath of twin crises, but not in the aftermath of
currency crises? This is because under currency crisis there is no illiquidity problem and solvency
problem should not be an issue for exporters who can hedge using their dollar income. Column (5)
27shows that this is indeed the case since now the triple interaction speciﬁcation show that exporters
with short term dollar debt do better than non-exporters with short term dollar debt, which is
consistent with Bleakley and Cowan (2008).27 Our results show that Aguiar (2005) results are
driven by domestic exporters who do not have access to liquidity under a twin crisis and Bleakley
and Cowan (2008) results are driven by ability of exporters to avoid insolvency as they highlight
and take advantage of investment opportunity during depreciations.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides systematic evidence on the key channel behind the contractionary nature of
ﬁnancial crises. The main reason why ﬁrms are constrained and hence investment and growth are
hindered in the aftermath of a ﬁnancial crisis is international and domestic illiquidity. By using
a unique hand-collected data set for 1,300 listed ﬁrms from six Latin American countries between
1990–2005, we disentangle the illiquidity channel from the insolvency channel. Our measure of
liquidity is foreign ownership. We proxy insolvency by balance-sheet mismatch caused by short-
term foreign currency debt conditional on leverage.
Our main result is that foreign-owned exporters with dollar debt perform better than domestic
exporters with dollar debt only during twin crises, where domestic ﬁrms access to ﬁnance is limited
given the troubled banking sector. There is no diﬀerence in investment between these ﬁrms during
currency crises. This implies foreign currency denominated debt is not a problem for exporters
perse since they match their short-term dollar debt with export revenue to avoid insolvency. During
twin crises, however, domestic exporters suﬀer from the problem of illiquidity and hence contract
investment and production as oppose to foreign-owned exporters.
Our results have important policy implications. First, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is
ﬁrst in quantifying the signiﬁcant real eﬀects of shocks to banking sector using ﬁrm-level investment
27The equation we estimate is given by:
yi;c;j;t = β1Exportsi;c;j;t 1  SDDebti;c;j;t 1  Postc;t + β2Exporteri;c;j;t 1  SDDebti;c;j;t 1 (4)
+ β3Exporteri;c;j;t 1  Postc;t + β4SDDebti;c;j;t 1  Postc;t + β5Exporteri;c;j;t 1
+ β6SDDebti;c;j;t 1 + ϕj;t + φc;t + αi + ξi;c;j;t
Notice that in order to be able to compare to Bleakley and Cowan (2008) and show that exporters with high export
revenue can match their balance sheets we follow Aguiar (2005) and deﬁne a high exporter as one that exports more
than ten percent of the sales.
28data. Second, short-term foreign currency borrowing may not be detrimental to ﬁrms’ balance-
sheets as long as their access to ﬁnance is not limited during periods of instability. Hence it is
important to provide liquidity to the banking sector during ﬁnancial crises especially if the domestic
banking sector is the main source of ﬁnancing for the ﬁrms.
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33Table 1 | Macroeconomic Outcomes of Twin and Currency Crises
Argentina Mexico Brazil Brazil
Outcome Period 2002 1995 1999 2002
GDP per capita growth prior crisis -3.7% 1.3% 0.2% 1.3%
crisis -2.5% -2.4% 0.8% 0.5%
post crisis 7.8% 4.2% 1.3% 3.1%
GFKF to GDP prior crisis -12.0% 2.7% 4.0% 2.7%
crisis -6.5% -9.5% -1.8% -5.0%
post crisis 25.0% 14.4% 2.7% 6.1%
Trade Balance to GDP prior crisis 1.0% 3.9% 3.1% 11.9%
crisis 29.4% 24.0% 15.7% 2.6%
post crisis 6.1% 1.1% 11.9% -0.8%
Notes: Using data on CPI, the real exchange rates were obtained as the deﬂated end of period exchange rates. A
currency crisis is deﬁned as a 25 percent increase in the real exchange rate relative to the previous year. We identify
four depreciation episodes in our sample: Argentina (2002), Mexico (1995), Brazil (1999) and Brazil (2002). Mexico
abandoned the peg in December 1994, Brazil in January 1999 and ﬁnally, Argentina in January 2002. Following
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008) we identify the following banking crises that predated a currency crisis: Argentina
(2001) and Mexico (1994). Therefore, there are two twin crises episodes (simultaneous currency and banking crisis)
in our sample: Argentina (2002) and Mexico (1995). Consequently the crises years are Argentina 2002 and 2003;
Mexico 1995 and 1996; Brazil 1999 and 2000; Brazil 2002 and 2003. We report percentage changes over a two
year period. GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product. GFKF to GDP stands for the ratio of Gross Fixed Capital
Formation to GDP. Trade Balance to GDP stands for the ratio of Exports minus Import to GDP.
34Table 2 | Percentage of Observations by Country
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Total
Foreign 0.53 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.32 0.25
Exporter 0.57 0.48 0.40 0.53 0.68 0.84 0.56
HighExporter 0.29 0.34 0.18 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.30
DumTotalDollarDebt 0.98 0.86 0.66 0.60 0.90 1.00 0.81
DumShortDollarDebt 0.94 0.67 0.65 0.59 0.89 1.00 0.76
DumDollarAssets 0.88 0.21 0.57 0.44 0.95 0.99 0.59
Observations 539 1292 1552 639 1634 519 6175
Notes: Observations refer to the sample of ﬁrms left after the cleaning procedure. The number of observations does not coincide with
the ﬁnal number of observations in the estimation due to missing data. Foreign is a dummy that takes a value of one if foreigners
own more than 50% of the company’s capital. Exporter is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ﬁrm reports export revenue
and zero otherwise. HighExporter is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ﬁrm reports export revenue greater than 10% of
sales. DumTotalDollarDebt is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ﬁrm reports positive total dollar denominated liabilities.
DumShortDollarDebt is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ﬁrm reports positive short-term dollar denominated liabilities.
DumDollarAssets is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ﬁrm reports positive total dollar denominated assets.
35Table 3 | Descriptive Statistics
Total Sample Exporter Sample
Mean sd Obs Mean sd Obs
SalesGrowth 0.01 0.33 5063 0.01 0.32 2988
Investment 0.001 0.07 5063 0.001 0.10 2988
TotalAssets 18.72 2.00 5063 19.00 1.79 2988
ShortDollarDebt 0.26 0.28 5063 0.35 0.29 2988
ExportShare 0.11 0.21 5063 0.17 0.24 2988
HighExporter 0.28 0.45 5063 0.42 0.49 2988
Foreign 0.15 0.36 5063 0.14 0.34 2988
Foreign Exporter 0.09 0.28 5063 . . .
Foreign HighExporter 0.04 0.19 5063 0.06 0.23 2988
ShortBankDebt 0.20 0.19 5063 0.22 0.20 2988
BondAbroad 0.02 0.14 5063 0.02 0.16 2988
LoanAbroad 0.05 0.21 5063 0.06 0.24 2988
EquityAbroad 0.02 0.15 5063 0.02 0.15 2988
Notes: Statistics refer to the ﬁnal sample of ﬁrms used in the estimation. The exporter sample is based on a predetermined export
dummy that is equal to one if the ﬁrm reported export revenue during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis and zero otherwise.
SalesGrowth is the change in log sales. Investment is physical stock of capital at time t minus physical stock of capital at time
t   1 normalized by total assets. TotalAssets is the log of lagged total assets. Foreign is the percentage of capital owned by
foreign investors (lagged). ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to short-term debt (lagged).
ExportShare is the ratio of export revenue to total sales (lagged). HighExporter is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ratio
of exports to sales is higher than 10% (based on lagged ExportShare). ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short-term bank debt to
total liabilities (lagged). BondAbroad dummy that takes a value of one if the ﬁrm has issued bonds abroad (lagged). LoanAbroad
dummy is similarly deﬁned if the ﬁrm has issued syndicated loans abroad (lagged). EquityAbroad dummy is equal to one if the
ﬁrm has issued equity abroad (lagged).
36Table 4 |Dollar Debt by Firm Type
Exporter Non-Exporter
Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observations
Argentina 0.52 0.58 106 0.44 0.41 58
Brazil 0.28 0.24 331 0.13 0.02 458
Chile 0.28 0.21 936 0.07 0.00 608
Colombia 0.10 0.04 328 0.07 0.00 293
Mexico 0.44 0.43 974 0.24 0.15 644
Peru 0.53 0.54 313 0.52 0.55 14
Total 0.35 0.31 2988 0.15 0.02 2075
Foreign Domestic
Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observations
Argentina 0.56 0.60 74 0.43 0.42 90
Brazil 0.17 0.08 105 0.19 0.11 684
Chile 0.17 0.04 362 0.21 0.07 1182
Colombia 0.09 0.08 37 0.09 0.01 584
Mexico 0.31 0.32 130 0.36 0.32 1488
Peru 0.48 0.46 109 0.56 0.57 218
Total 0.26 0.17 817 0.26 0.16 4246
Foreign Exporter Domestic Exporter
Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observations
Argentina 0.58 0.61 47 0.47 0.52 59
Brazil 0.30 0.34 42 0.28 0.23 289
Chile 0.21 0.11 224 0.30 0.23 712
Colombia 0.09 0.08 37 0.10 0.03 291
Mexico 0.33 0.33 119 0.45 0.45 855
Peru 0.47 0.44 105 0.56 0.57 208
Total 0.31 0.27 574 0.35 0.31 2414
Foreign High Exporter Domestic High Exporter
Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observations
Argentina 0.61 0.69 25 0.47 0.51 27
Brazil 0.35 0.41 19 0.29 0.25 238
Chile 0.21 0.11 62 0.40 0.37 352
Colombia 0.13 0.15 8 0.16 0.07 107
Mexico 0.33 0.31 42 0.55 0.58 445
Peru 0.53 0.54 46 0.65 0.70 108
Total 0.37 0.35 202 0.43 0.43 1277
Notes: Mean, median and number of observations for the variable ShortDollarDebt are reported. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio
of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to short-term debt. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm
reports any export revenue at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is more than 50% owned at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis
and 0 otherwise. HighExporter is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm reports export revenue higher than 10%
of sales at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis and 0 otherwise.
37Table 5 | The Differential Response of Foreigners Holding Dollar Debt During Crises
Dependent Variable: Investment
Subsample of Exporters
Crisis Twin Crises Currency Crises
Exporter Deﬁnition Benchmark Predetermined Benchmark Predetermined
Foreign Deﬁnition Benchmark Benchmark Predeterm Predeterm Benchmark Benchmark Predeterm Predeterm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ShortDollarDebtForeignPost 0.211** 0.280** 0.183* 0.191** -0.068 -0.013 -0.060 -0.063
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
ShortDollarDebt  Foreign 0.017 0.045* 0.007 0.017 0.034 0.056** 0.020 0.025
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Foreign  Post 0.127* 0.143* 0.113* 0.043 -0.033 0.003 -0.019 -0.011
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
ShortDollarDebt  Post -0.150** -0.190** -0.182** -0.182** 0.053 0.060 0.063 0.063
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Foreign 0.012 0.018 . . 0.016 0.020 . .
(0.02) (0.02) . . (0.02) (0.02) . .
ShortDollarDebt -0.013 0.009 0.015 0.016 -0.025 -0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ShortBankDebt -0.023 -0.037** -0.037** -0.041** -0.021 -0.036** -0.036** -0.042**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BondAbroad 0.029* 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.033** 0.035 0.035 0.031
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
InternationalLoan 0.000 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Equity 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1394 1445 1445 1445 1394 1445 1445 1445
Firms 305 233 233 233 305 233 233 233
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Foreign*year no no no yes no no no yes
F-test
ShortDollarDebt 0.039 0.007 0.034 0.008 0.703 0.079 0.855 0.751
Foreign 0.006 0.009 0.230 0.016 0.731 0.219 0.883 0.692
ShortDollarDebt  Post 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.004 0.630 0.651 0.647 0.662
Foreign  Post 0.007 0.028 0.139 0.008 0.524 0.908 0.784 0.566
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. Investment is normalized by total assets. In columns (1) to (4) Post is a
dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of the twin crisis and one year after; the starting year is 2002 for Argentina and 1995 for Mexico. Columns (5) to (7) refer
to currency crises; the starting year is 1999 and 2002 in Brazil. Starting years are the depreciation years in both cases. In columns (1) and (5) the subsample of exporters refers
to those ﬁrms with export to sales ratios greater than 10 percent lagged one period. In columns (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8) the subsample of exporters is based on whether
the ﬁrm reported export revenue greater than 10% of sales at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis. Foreign is a dummy variable that takes a value of one
if foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company and zero otherwise and it is lagged one period except in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) where foreign is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company at any time in the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis. ShortDollarDebt is the
ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to total short-term liabilities. ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total liabilities. BondAbroad is
a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues a corporate bond abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues
syndicated loans abroad. Equity is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period. The F-test reports the
corresponding p-values associated to the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients associated with each variable of interest. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
ShortDollarDebt  Foreign  Post 0.236** 0.178** 0.121** 0.191**
(0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
ShortDollarDebt  Foreign 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.031
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ShortDollarDebt 0.012 0.008 0.022 0.016
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
ShortDollarDebt  Post -0.238** -0.152** -0.209** -0.182**
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Foreign . . . .
. . . .
Foreign  Post 0.083 0.037 0.030 0.053
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
DollarAssets -0.019
(0.04)












ShortBankDebt -0.048** -0.039** -0.036** -0.054**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
BondAbroad -0.002 0.009 0.031 0.022
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
InternationalLoan 0.021 0.007 0.011 0.016
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Equity 0.004 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1188 1409 1445 1392
Firms 200 230 233 231
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Sector*year yes yes yes yes
Country*year yes yes yes yes
Foreign*year yes yes yes yes
F-test
ShortDollarDebt 0.199 0.034 0.016 0.006
ShortDollarDebt  Post 0.080 0.020 0.007 0.005
Foreign  Post 0.102 0.025 0.136 0.028
NewControl  Post 0.443 0.000 0.002
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. Investment is normalized by total assets. In
columns (1) to (4) Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of the twin crisis and one year after in Argentina (2002) and
Mexico (1995). The subsample of exporters is based on predetermined values and it refers to those ﬁrms with export to sales ratios greater than 10
percent at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis. Foreign is similarly deﬁned in terms of predetermined values and takes a value of
one if foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis and zero otherwise. All
speciﬁcations control for foreign*year trends. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to total short-term liabilities.
DollarAssets is the ratio of dollar assets to total assets. Foreign is a dummy that takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 percent
of the company at any time in the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis. Cash is the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Leverage is the log of the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. LongBankDebt is the ratio of long term debt from banks to total liabilities. ShortBankDebt is the ratio
of short term debt from banks to total liabilities. BondAbroad is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues a corporate bond
abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues syndicated loans abroad. Equity is a dummy that takes
a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period. The F-test reports the corresponding p-values associated
to the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients associated with each variable of interest. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,





Mexico 1995 Brazil 1999 Brazil 2002
(1) (2) (3)
ShortDollarDebt  Foreign  Post 0.242** 0.540 -0.025
(0.09) (0.34) (0.13)
ShortDollarDebt  Foreign -0.189 0.191** 0.160
(0.15) (0.07) (0.09)
ShortDollarDebt 0.016 -0.058 -0.031
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
ShortDollarDebt  Post -0.158 0.142 0.006
(0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
Foreign . . .
. . .
Foreign  Post 0.187 0.153 0.092
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09)
ShortBankDebt -0.027 -0.068 -0.045
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
BondAbroad 0.043* -0.033 -0.056
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
LoanAbroad -0.029 0.062 0.066
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
EquityAbroad 0.014 0.034 0.038
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 393 212 212
Firms 71 49 49
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects yes yes yes
Sector*year yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes
Foreign*year yes yes yes
F-test
ShortDollarDebt 0.032 0.000 0.000
ShortDollarDebt  Post 0.010 0.067 0.980
Foreign  Post 0.031 0.289 0.260
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. Investment is normalized by total assets.
In column (1) Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of the twin crisis in Mexico (1995) and one year after. In column
(2) Post is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year of the 1999 currency crisis and one year after in Brazil. In column (3) Post is a
dummy that takes a value of one in 2002 and one year after corresponding to the currency crisis in Brazil. The subsample of exporters is based
on predetermined values and it refers to those ﬁrms with export to sales ratios greater than 10 percent at any time during the three years
prior to the ﬁrst crisis. Foreign is similarly deﬁned in terms of predetermined values and takes a value of one if foreign investors own more
than 49 percent of the company at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations control for
foreign*year trends. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to total short-term liabilities. ShortBankDebt
is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total liabilities. BondAbroad is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues a
corporate bond abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues syndicated loans abroad. Equity
is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period. The F-test reports the
corresponding p-values associated to the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients associated with each variable of interest. *, ** and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
40Table 8 | Performance of Foreigners During Crises: Sample of Solvent Firms
Dependent Variable: Investment
Twin Crises Currency Crises
Sample of Firms All All Exporter All All Exporter
Foreign Deﬁnition Benchmark Predetermined Predetermined Benchmark Predetermined Predetermined
Exporter Deﬁnition Predetermined Predetermined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign  Post 0.045* 0.054* 0.083** 0.002 -0.000 -0.009
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Foreign 0.007 0.009
(0.01) (0.01)
ShortBankDebt -0.031** -0.032** -0.046** -0.030** -0.030** -0.042**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BondAbroad 0.063* 0.063* 0.047 0.063* 0.063* 0.049
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
InternationalLoan -0.012 -0.012 0.002 -0.012 -0.013 0.002
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Equity -0.015 -0.016 -0.006 -0.016 -0.016 -0.006
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 2956 2956 1849 2956 2956 1849
Firms 454 454 278 454 454 278
F-test
Foreign 0.049 . . 0.602 . .
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. Investment is normalized by total assets. In columns (1) to (3) Post is
a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of the twin crisis and one year after in Argentina (2002) and Mexico (1995). In columns (4) to (6) Post is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one in the year of currency crises and one year after in Brazil (1999) and (2002). The “solvent” ﬁrm sample refers to the sample of ﬁrms with no
mismatch and is deﬁned as ﬁrms with
Exports ShortDollarLiab
Assets  0. In columns (3) and (6) the subsample of exporters is based on predetermined values and it refers to those
ﬁrms with positive export to sales ratios at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis. Foreign is a dummy that takes a value of one if foreign investors own more
than 49 percent of the company. In columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) Foreign is deﬁned in terms of predetermined values and takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than
49 percent of the company at any time during the three years prior to the ﬁrst crisis and zero otherwise. ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total
liabilities. BondAbroad is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues a corporate bond abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes a value of one in
the year the ﬁrm issues syndicated loans abroad. Equity is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period.
The F-test reports the corresponding p-values associated to the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients associated with each variable of interest. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
41Table 9 |Performance of Exporters During Crises
Dependent variable: Investment
Exporter Definition: Predetermined Dummy
All Crises Twin Crises Currency Crises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exporter  Post 0.0001 0.007 -0.007 0.024** 0.043**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
ShortDollarDebt  Post -0.056** -0.078** -0.013 -0.063
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
ShortDollarDebt -0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ShortDollarDebtExporterPost 0.134*
(0.02)




Observations 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063
Firms 864 864 864 864 864
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes
F-test
ShortDollarDebt 0.040 0.001 0.395 0.404
Exporter 0.014
ShortDollarDebt  Post 0.242
Exporter  Post 0.086
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. Sales regressions control for size by including the log of total assets
lagged one period. Investment is normalized by total assets. Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of the depreciation and one year after.
Columns (1) and (2) refer to all crises so that the starting depreciation year is 2002 for Argentina and Brazil, 1999 for Brazil and 1995 for Mexico. Column (3) refers to
twin crises so that the starting depreciation year is 2002 for Argentina and 1995 for Mexico. Finally column (4) refers to currency crises and the starting depreciation
year is 1999 and 2002 in Brazil. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm reports export revenue at any time during the three years prior to the
ﬁrst crisis and 0 otherwise. Only in column (5) Exporter is deﬁned as one if the ﬁrm exported more than ten percent of sales. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term
dollar denominated liabilities to total short-term liabilities and it is lagged one period. The F-test reports the corresponding p-values associated to the joint signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients associated with each variable of interest. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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48A Cleaning Procedure
We drop all ﬁrm/year observations in which the accounting data are not self-consistent. In par-
ticular, we drop observations if dollar liabilities (assets) exceed total liabilities (assets) or if the
ratio of exports to sales is greater than one. We drop ﬁrm-year observations with zero or missing
sales. Finally, we drop ﬁrm-year observations in the top (low) 1 percent of the distribution of the
ratio of sales to total assets and total liabilities to total assets. These adjustments led to drop-
ping 16 percent of the remaining ﬁrm-year observations. To ensure that results are not driven by
outliers, we then dropped all ﬁrm/year observations for explanatory variables that exceeded the
sample mean by more than ﬁve standard deviations. We compute the change in total assets, sales
and physical capital stock and construct a Z-score using the sample mean and standard deviation
for each country/year. We drop ﬁrm/year observations that have absolute value of Z > 5. We
drop ﬁrm/year observations for which the ratio of investment over assets is greater than one or
less than minus one. These controls for outliers (either because of inadequate accounting, typing
errors or extreme values). These adjustments led to dropping 19 percent of the remaining ﬁrm-year
observations. These exclusions leave us with complete information for an unbalanced panel of 6,175
ﬁrm-year observations, which consist of 931 ﬁrms with an average of around 7 years each. Notice
through out the analysis we use lagged values of the main variables and therefore, we loose one year.
Finally, data on additional controls included later on in the estimation leaves us with a sample of
5,063 observations or 864 ﬁrms.
B Foreign Ownership Variable
We gathered information on all cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in Latin America
between 1981 and 2005 using the SDC Platinum database from Thompson (for the period 1981 to
2001) and Zephyr from Bureau Van Dijk (from 1997 to 2005). Given that there was no common ﬁrm-
identiﬁer across databases, we used a search algorithm based on ﬁrms’ names and economic sectors
to match M&A transactions to ﬁrms in our sample. We took into account possible changes in ﬁrms’
names drawing on a list of company name changes from the Economatica database. In addition, we
doubled checked with various internet resources, including the information provided by the company
on its own web page and that of the Funding Universe website (www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/) that provides information on companies’ history.
We construct a continuous, time-varying measure of foreign ownership based on the percentage
49fraction of shares held by foreign and domestic investors in each year. For example, the M&A
databases would identify an M&A transaction where a foreign company that already owned 50
percent of a company in a target country, buys 10 percent more of that company. Our foreign
ownership variable would be 50 until the time of the transaction and 60 thereafter. In the case where
we had more than one foreign investor in the same year we faced the problem of not knowing if the
foreign companies were buying from each other, from other domestic investors, or rather directly
from the target company. In those cases we checked the company history proﬁle, the Funding
Universe website and other specialized newspaper information. In the rare case that information
was not available, we decided on a conservative measure of foreign ownership and assumed that the
foreign companies bought from each other. We then merged this information with annual balance
sheet data. In the few cases of target ﬁrms being renamed after the acquisition, we kept the old id
number rather than creating a new company after the M&A.
Of course there might be ways other than M&As for foreign investors to invest in ﬁrms. First,
foreign ownership acquisitions can arise by means of IPOs, venture capital activity, or private equity
deals, which are not covered in M&As hence in our procedure. Second, several foreign-owned ﬁrms
could have been established before 1980, and not involved in a M&A since then. To remedy this,
we used the Corporations Aﬃliations database to identify Latin American ﬁrms in our sample that
are aﬃliates, subsidiaries and/or divisions of global multinational ﬁrms. This database contains
international public and private business proﬁles and corporate linkage (“who owns whom”) for
approximately 184,000 public and private companies worldwide. Notice, in addition to the “formal”
sources of foreign ownership data we checked ﬁrm by ﬁrm company’s history. After this extensive
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































51Table A2 | Performance of Foreigners during Crises
Dependent variable: Investment
Crisis All Crises Twin Crises Currency Crises
Sample All All Exporter Exporter All Exporter Exporter
Foreign Deﬁnition Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Predeterm Benchmark Benchmark Predeterm
Exporter Deﬁnition Predeterm Predeterm Predeterm Predeterm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foreign  Post 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.051** 0.058** 0.031** 0.021 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Foreign -0.005 -0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ShortBankDebt -0.021** -0.020** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.021** -0.037*** -0.036***







Observations 5063 5063 2967 2967 5063 2967 2967
Firms 864 864 470 470 864 470 470
Year Fixed-Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
F-test
Foreign 0.002 0.002 0.004 . 0.127 0.364 .
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the year level are reported in parenthesis. Notice Investment is normalized by total assets. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one in the year of the depreciation and one year after. Column (1) refers to all crises so that the starting depreciation year is 2002 for Argentina and Brazil, 1999 for Brazil and 1995 for
Mexico. Columns (2)to (4) refer to twin crises so that the starting depreciation year is 2002 for Argentina and 1995 for Mexico. Finally, columns (5) to (7) refer to currency crises and the
starting depreciation year is 1999 and 2002 in Brazil. Columns (3), (4), (6), and (7) report results for the sample of exporters where Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the ﬁrm reports export revenue at any time during the three years prior to the crisis and 0 otherwise. In columns (4) and (7) Foreign is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm
is more than 50% owned at any time during the three years prior to the crisis and 0 otherwise. ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total liabilities. BondAbroad is a
dummy that takes the value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues a corporate bond abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes the value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues syndicated loans
abroad. Equity is a dummy that takes the value of one in the year the ﬁrm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period. The F-test reports the corresponding p-values associated
to the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients associated with each variable of interest. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
52